Understanding rational actions requires perspective taking both in 23 respect to means and in respect to objectives. This study addressed According to a time-honored view, explanations of intentional actions show the agent ''in his role 44 of Rational Animal'' (Davidson, 1963) . Intentional actions are inherently goal-directed. They are, in 45 other words, intelligible in terms of what the agent regarded as an effective means to achieve some it as having been a rational thing to do, at least in some minimal sense of ''rationality.'' As Davidson 48 put it, ''From the agent's point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action '' 49 (emphasis added). 50 Now we can distinguish two ways in which the agent's point of view may differ from that of the 51 interpreter (someone seeking to understand why the agent did what he did). First, the interpreter 52 may regard the means adopted by the agent as mistaken or suboptimal. Second, the interpreter might 53 not share the agent's objective, possibly (but not necessarily) because it is incompatible with the inter-54 preter's own objectives. Then, if the time-honored view is correct, understanding intentional actions 55 would seem to require a basic form of perspective taking both in relation to means and in relation to 56 objectives. First, the interpreter needs to be able to explain an action in terms of the agent's instru-57 mental beliefs-beliefs the interpreter might not regard as correct. We call this ability ''instrumental 58 perspective taking.'' For example, the interpreter needs to find it intelligible, in a standard false belief 59 task, that in order to retrieve his chocolate, Max chooses to go to the blue cupboard owing to his false 60 belief that this is where the chocolate is. Second, the interpreter needs to be able to explain an action 61 in terms of a goal he does not share or does not take to be worthwhile. We call this ability ''telic per-62 spective taking.'' There are, of course, a variety of reasons why an interpreter might not endorse the 63 agent's goal. Perhaps the interpreter thinks the goal reflects a mistaken instrumental belief about 64 how to achieve some further goal (e.g., the agent may seek to open a certain bottle because he mistak-65 enly believes it contains gin). Or, more interesting, the interpreter may regard the proposed outcome 66 as undesirable or bad (e.g., the interpreter may regard the agent's having another glass of gin as unde-67 sirable because it would be harmful to him or because the interpreter would like to finish off the bottle 68 herself). Again, of course, the interpreter might simply be indifferent to the agent's enterprise. 69 A basic developmental question raised by this distinction is whether children acquire the capacity 70 for perspective taking with respect to objectives and with respect to means at the same time. year-olds are notoriously poor at predicting and explaining intentional actions in terms of mistaken 72 instrumental beliefs-means falsely regarded by the agent as effective (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 73 2001). But are they able to explain actions in terms of objectives they do not share? A stable finding 74 in the development of belief-desire psychology is that in some ways young children find it easier to 75 come to grips with desires than with beliefs. Thus, it is sometimes said that young children are ''desire 76 psychologists'' before they acquire a ''desire-belief psychology'' (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman, 77 1990). One might interpret this theory as holding that telic perspective taking precedes instrumental 78 perspective taking. There are a number of extant findings that may seem to support this view-find-79 ings that are often thought to show that children understand the subjectivity of desires before they 80 understand the subjectivity of beliefs (Rakoczy, 2010; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997) . Closer inspection, 81 however, reveals that ''appreciating the subjectivity of desires'' can mean a number of things, not 82 all of which involve telic perspective taking. On the specific issue of the development of instrumental 83 and telic perspective taking, the extant evidence, we contend, is inconclusive. The aim of the current 84 study was to present new evidence that directly speaks to that issue. 85 Perner, Zauner, and Sprung (2005, Fig. 11 .4) reviewed several studies using three different para-86 digms that were considered as relevant in this context-wicked desires, conflicting desires, and com-87 petition-and their relation to performance on the false belief task. The results of these studies 88 appeared to support the theory that there is a single capacity emerging that enables both instrumental 89 and telic perspective taking at the same age (''unified perspective thesis''). Subsequent studies with 90 these paradigms led to contradictory results. We look at these data more closely later in the Discus-91 sion. First, it is important to clarify when exactly understanding different desires requires telic per-92 spective taking. This was not satisfactorily explained in Perner and colleagues' (2005) work.
93
A clearer answer to this question has emerged from a reconceptualization of belief-desire psychol-94 ogy as ''teleology-in-perspective'' (Perner & Roessler, 2010) . This was motivated by solving some foun-95 dational problems with the two dominant characterizations of folk psychology as a theory or as 96 simulation. One motivation was to remind the field (pace theory) that folk psychology sees beliefs 97 and desires not just as causes of behavior but also as reasons for acting (Anscombe, 1957; Davidson, 98 1963 (Goldman, 1989; Goldman, 2006) , one then discovers that these are a belief 110 that the chocolate is still in its old place and an action tendency to go there. It is, however, intuitively 111 not at all clear that we actually proceed in this way, and the existence of introspection of this kind has 112 been a perennial problem (Carruthers, 2011; Gordon, 1995 when the robber came to steal the treasure (one-box trial) or whether they wanted to lock the empty 158 box or the one with the treasure (two-box trial). They were told that they should not let the robber 159 find the treasure. Importantly, this instruction already specified the robber's action to be undermined, 160 and so there was no need to infer this action from the robber's goal. Preventing something by being 161 explicitly told what to prevent should not cause a problem for the teleologist child. Indeed, most of bution and found that for normal children sabotage was only slightly easier than the false belief task. 165 Other studies using this paradigm taking, the reported differences are too small to speak against the unified perspective thesis.
168
There are also some data on children's appreciation of competitive games. A venerable study by Benenson, 2002) . This is a simple game of dice where each player needs to collect beads on a stick.
188
The aim of the game is to be the first to reach a finish mark. Most important, the players are allowed with the children, and for a first warm-up children were asked to pick a stand for playing the game and 233 were invited to put three beads on their stand. After that, the experimenter explained the rules of the 234 game in a standardized routine. She emphasized that the aim of the game was to fill the stand to the 235 top as quickly as possible and that children could take the number of beads according to the number of 236 dots on the die either from the community basket (''neutral move'') or from another player (''poaching 237 move''). They were further told that the player who filled the stand first would be the winner of the 238 game. A practice round was conducted, with each child being asked to repeat the game rules individ-239 ually (''Where are you allowed to take beads from?'' and ''Can you tell me how you can win the 240 game?''). In case of incorrect or incomplete answers, the rules were explained again until the child 241 was able to answer both questions correctly (''the basket, Player 1, and Player 2'' and ''be the first 242 whose stand is completely filled'', respectively). To make children constantly aware that there were 243 two legitimate options of taking beads, each child was asked after every die throw whether she or 244 he would like to take the beads from the basket or from another player's stand. The second experi-245 menter was seated on a chair some distance from the children where she could see the die and the 246 three stands. For each individual move, the number on the die and the location from where the player 247 took the beads were recorded.
248
False belief task 249 Two standard unexpected transfer false belief tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) were administered. 250 The picture stories were displayed on a laptop (PowerPoint) and narrated by the experimenter. Apart To be able to check whether the correlation between game and false belief task is due to differences 266 in intelligence, inhibitory control, or working memory, the following tasks were used. there,'' ''she doesn't know it's in the other box,'' ''he didn't see it being moved''); (2) relevant story answers (e.g., ''because he wants the ball''); (4) wrong location, 9 answers (e.g., ''she should go over 300 there''); (5) irrelevant facts, 5 answers (e.g., ''he is silly,'' ''because he is wearing a blue jacket''); and 301 (6) no or ''don't know,'' 28 answers. In the case of multiple answers, the one that fit the highest cat-302 egory was used.
303
For further analysis, these categories were recoded as understanding (2 points for category 1 an-304 swers), transitional (1 point for category 2 answers), and no understanding (0 points for answers in cat-305 egories 3-6). Explanations referring to the protagonist's desire (category 3) were coded as incorrect 306 because insisting on the agent's desire to justify an erroneous action is uninformative (Wimmer & 307 Mayringer, 1998). In contrast, relevant story facts (category 2) were scored as correct because even 308 an adult might answer in this way as a shorthand indication of the causal source of the agent's error.
309
However, because it is not clear whether referring to a relevant story fact is a reliable indicator for 310 false belief understanding, category 2 answers were coded as transitional answers.
311
Relating prediction and explanation
312
Taking both stories together, children could reach a total score ranging from 0 to 6 consisting of 0 to of understanders-transitionals-non-understanders, we tried to capture these distinctions.
323
Bead collecting game move. For further analysis, the proportion of poaching moves to the total number of moves was used. 
Control measures

332
Means and standard deviations of the four control tasks are reported in Table 1 . Four children did 333 not participate in the phonological working memory task because of either motivational (n = 1) or 334 spelling (n = 3) problems, and one child refused to take part in the visual working memory task. Miss-335 ing data were replaced by mean substitution (i.e., replacing values with the sample mean). Furthermore, the correlation between false belief understanding and poaching moves was exam-347 ined. Spearman's rho revealed a statistically significant relation between false belief scores (0-6) 348 and proportion of poaching moves, r s (71) = .36, p = .002. Table 1 shows that this correlation was 349 mostly due to performance on the prediction task and displays all other relevant raw correlations. 350 Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test whether performance on the false belief The main result of this study was that very few children who failed the false belief task showed any 394 tendency to engage in competitive poaching moves. The paucity of such moves persisted even when 395 these children suffered from their opponents' poaching moves. This is a strong sign that these children 396 cannot make sense of competitive behavior. In contrast, children who passed the false belief test en-397 gaged more often in competitive poaching moves, and this tendency was enhanced when they were 398 subjected to such moves from others. Of course, not every child who understands competition neces- compatible desire tasks and were easier than false belief problems. For us, the fundamental question is 434 why awareness of perspective should be necessary in these tasks. Note that correct answers to the test 435 questions provide no evidence that children understand that the players are engaged in competition.
436
Children merely need to understand that the puppet wants, say, a blue card to be drawn given that this 437 is what is needed to complete the puzzle the puppet is working on, not that the puppet wants a card to 438 be drawn that will hinder completion of children's own puzzle. wanted to take the canal to the left, and the girl wanted to take the canal to the right. After they drifted 475 to the right, children were asked to judge who was happier. In the control story, the boy and girl each 476 sat in a boat but otherwise had the same preferences. and intentions (Shultz & Shamash, 1981 ; see reviews by Astington, 1999; Astington, 2001 ). Schult 1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this argument and are also grateful for many other valuable comments from the three reviewers that helped to improve the manuscript.
(2002) included children as young as 3 years. They needed to toss beanbags into different buckets, 535 some of which contained a ticket for a prize. For each toss, children needed to indicate which bucket 536 they intended to hit. On some trials they hit the intended bucket and on others they missed it, and on 537 some trials they won a prize and on others they did not-resulting in four different combinations. The dentally get the prize after hitting a bucket they did not intend to hit, poses a problem. To understand 545 that they did not intend to hit the bucket, children need to realize that they had no reason for hitting 546 that particular bucket despite the fact that doing so turned out to be conducive to reaching their goal.
547
A similar problem occurs in cases of bad luck, that is, where they hit the intended bucket without get-548 ting a prize. To understand that they hit the bucket intentionally, children need to understand that 549 they did have a reason for hitting that bucket despite the fact that doing so turned out not to be con-550 ducive to reaching their goal. Correct judgment of these cases becomes possible only when one under-551 stands that one acted on the assumption that the prize might be in the bucket that one was aiming for.
552
Because in the critical cases this assumption has turned out to be false, the intentionality of the in- 
574
This is akin to simulation theory in that interpretation requires perspective taking. However, unlike 575 simulation, teleology-in-perspective does not essentially involve imaginative identification with others 576 or recreating mental states in pretend mode (Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986 ).
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